I hope, if proposing this question re-treads material already exhausted previously, that revisiting it has also a quality of refreshing it. But also, to avoid taking up a lot of space with any sort of startled “discovery” of the issue on my part, I intend only to submit it to the collective intelligence of the people here.
Women’s inalienble right for reproductive choice implies then an inalienable right to choose adoption.
We can critique the forms of adoption available or imaginable, but this does not negate the right to choose adoption. We might insist that between adoption and abortion, it becomes a question of the lesser evil, but that doesn’t negate the right to choose either. And since a choice of one is not a choice, to say (1) abortion only, (2) motherhood only, or (3) adoption only negates the principle of choice itself and substitutes in its place coercion or what Schiller would identify as violence.
This question frames the ethics of adoption in light of only one-third of the triad and in that sense is misleading. But to the extent that sometimes (gendered) resentment by adoptees gets directed (justly or not) against the one (who may actually be two or more) who exercised an (inalienable) choice, then to focus the question in this way may shed more light on the larger structural and cultural aspect of adoption as we currently have it.
If the right to choose adoption has limits, then how would you frame those?